Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Federal Indian Law by Frickey, Philip P.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 87 Issue 6 
1989 
Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Federal Indian Law 
Philip P. Frickey 
University of Minnesota 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Philip P. Frickey, Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Federal Indian Law, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1199 (1989). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol87/iss6/4 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
SCHOLARSHIP, PEDAGOGY, AND FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW 
Philip P. Frickey* 
AMERICAN INDIAN LA w IN A NUTSHELL. Second Edition. By Wil-
liam C. Canby, Jr. St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1988. Pp. xliii, 
336. $ 12.95. 
What follows is largely a review in search of a book. That alone 
hardly makes this essay unique, since law reviews publish a wide vari-
ety of things under the rubric of book reviews. Yet using a nutshell 
even as a point of departure for a broader discussion abou~ a field of 
law will probably strike many as atypical, if not bizarre. Because nut-
shells are study aids for law students, law professors tend to dismiss 
them as beside the scholarly point - they are seen as too succinct and 
summary to be worthy of critical attention.1 This reaction ignores two 
important variables: the aspirations of the author and the alternative 
sources of exposition. in the particular field of law. If the author sees 
herself as providing analysis and perspective, not just an understand-
able array of rules, the reader may well see through the black letter 
superstructure and better grasp the fundamental nature of that area of 
the law. Even a work designed primarily as a study aid might fill part 
of a scholarly void if other general sources in the area are either fo-
cused differently or nonexistent. 
As a student a decade ago, I remember encountering two nutshells 
of scholarly note: one on federal jurisdiction, by David Currie,2 the 
other on criminal procedure, by Jerold Israel and Wayne LaFave.3 
From the perspective of a student, these nutshells were valuable be-
cause they presented more than a concise synthesis of the state of the 
law. These nutshells encouraged readers to analyze, not memorize. 
Later, as a law clerk in the federal courts, I turned to the Israel and 
LaFave nutshell frequently, in part because there was nothing else that 
could be consulted as quickly and painlessly. In retrospect, I suspect 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. B.A. 1975, University of Kansas; 
J.D. 1978, University of Michigan. -Ed. Carol Chomsky, William Eskridge, Daniel Farber, 
Nell Jessup Newton, Gerald Torres, and Robert A. Williams, Jr. provided helpful comments on 
an earlier draft. 
1. See Conkle, Book Review, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 214, 214-15 (1988). Professor Conkle 
identified this stereotype but did not fall victim to it. 
2. D. CURRIE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL (1976). 
3. J. lsRAEL & W. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL (2d ed. 1975). No 
doubt there were other superior nutshells in my student days, but the Currie book and the Israel 
and LaFave book are the ones that I still remember as being highly useful. 
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that Israel and LaFave were led to create such a thoughtful nutshell 
not only because of their own scholarly bent, but also because there 
was no general treatise or hornbook on criminal procedure. 4 They 
have since filled that void themselves, expanding their nutshell into a 
multi-volume treatise for practitioners5 and a one-volume hornbook 
for students. 6 
Federal Indian law7 is in somewhat the same position today as 
criminal procedure was a decade ago. There is a thorough one-volume 
treatise published in 1982, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 8 but it is 
becoming outdated and, in any event, seems focused more on the 
problems of the practitioner than those of the law professor or stu-
dent. 9 Unlike criminal procedure, however, there has been relatively 
little scholarly writing of a general nature about federal Indian law. 
Yet, even in such a sparse field, the publication of a nutshell is unlikely 
to have any significant scholarly impact. The formidable requirements 
of the nutshell format - severe length limitations coupled with the 
primary goal of analyzing the law simply and clearly for student con-
sumption - make that impossible. But an excellent nutshell can as-
sist, perhaps even encourage, the scholarly mission by stimulating an 
analytical approach to law school teaching and learning. The nature 
of federal Indian law, coupled with the absence of any convenient one-
volume scholarly treatment, makes this kind of opportunity peculiarly 
available even for the lowly nutshell. 
Judge William Canby first exploited this opening in 1981, when the 
first edition of his nutshell on federal Indian law was published. 10 A 
second edition recently appeared. 11 For those of us who teach in this 
area, the publication of the second edition is a welcome event that, 
4. Indeed, Jaw review writing sometimes treated Israel and Lafave's nutshell much like a 
treatise, which indicated both the quality of the book and the Jack of alternatives. See, e.g., Note, 
A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 16 MICH. L. REV. 154, 167 n.59, 174 
nn.93 & 95 (1977). 
5. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1984). 
6. w. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1985). The nutshell remains, how-
ever, in updated form. See J. ISRAEL & w. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 
(4th ed. 1988). 
7. By "federal Indian law," I mean simply federal law concerning Native Americans. Since 
this is the conventional name for the field, I will use it even though it perpetuates a misnomer 
relating to Christopher Columbus' geographical confusion. 
8. FELIX s. CoHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (R. Strickland ed. 1982) [here-
inafter HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW]. This volume is a substantial updating of the 
classic work in the field by Felix Cohen, see F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
(1942). Cohen's book should not be confused with a 1958 volume issued by the Department of 
the Interior that purported simply to update the 1942 book but in fact took a much less generous 
approach to tribal sovereignty and Native American rights. See OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR, U.S. 
DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1958). 
9. See infra text accompanying notes 68 & 74-81. 
10. W. CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL (1981). 
11. W. CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL (2d ed. 1988). 
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notwithstanding the limitations of the nutshell format, should contrib-
ute to our scholarship as well as to our students' learning.12 To under-
stand why requires a look at both the peculiar nature of federal Indian 
law and the other general scholarship in this area. This examination, 
in turn, leads to some insights about an agenda for future scholarship, 
including the need for a scholarly hornbook. In the last analysis, eval-
uating the nutshell in a broad context illuminates much about the 
strengths and weaknesses of this area of law. 
I 
Over one hundred years ago, a Harvard Law Review article pro-
claimed that "[t]he American student could select few single subjects 
the survey of which would bring under view a greater variety of im-
portant general principles, or afford more scope for forensic reasoning 
in the application of such principles, than the law relating to Indi-
ans." 13 Today, the few students who survey federal Indian law - in 
academic year 1987-1988, only thirty-four American law professors 
indicated that they offered such a course or seminar14 - would proba-
bly be amused by this century-old assertion. The important genera\ 
principles in this field seem conflicting and confounding, regardless of 
the student's forensic reasoning skills. 15 Although seemingly amena-
ble to black letter rule "codification" on the surface, federal Indian 
law, upon careful examination, may often appear closer to the novelist 
Mark Harris' card game TEGWAR - "The Exciting Game Without 
Any Rules" 16 - except that the federal government always gets to 
deal. 
In my experience, students and novice professors alike initially find 
that learning, teaching, and writing about federal Indian law are for-
eign experiences. There are probably myriad reasons why this is so, 
but I wish to dwell upon five. Each demonstrates that federal Indian 
law desperately needs a single source - and a good nutshell helps, for 
starters - that is current, broad in scope, and analytical and detached 
in outlook. 
First, federal Indian law is highly complicated and often inconsis-
tent. To take just one complicated example, consider the authority of 
the federal government, the states, and the tribes to exercise sover-
eignty over Indian country. State authority to regulate in Indian 
12. For enthusiasm of a somewhat different sort about the first edition of Canby's nutshell, 
see Clinton, Book Review, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 377 (1983). 
13. Abbott, Indians and the Law, 2 HARV. L. REv. 167, 167 (1888). 
14. AssOCIATION OF AM. LAW SCHOOLS, DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 993 (1987-1988). 
In addition, some law schools offer the course through a part-time or adjunct instructor, and 
some colleges and junior colleges provide some variety of instruction on this subject. 
15. See infra text accompanying notes 92-99. 
0 16. M. HARRIS, BANG THE DRUM SLOWLY 8 (1956). 
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country within the state may be barred by comprehensive federal stat-
utes and treaties that leave no room for the exercise of state author-
ity, 17 by less explicit federal laws read generously to preserve tribal 
sovereignty, 18 or by federal common law designed to protect the right 
of reservation Indians to self-government.19 Even so, the states may 
be allowed to regulate if the conduct sought to be regulated would 
have effects outside Indian country.20 The standards for each of the 
three preemptive strands, and for the state's buffering authority sur-
rounding Indian country, are far from clear.21 However, the tribe's 
correlative inherent authority to regulate its own members in Indian 
country is well established,22 and that authority, because it is inherent 
in the tribe's sovereignty and predates European "discovery" of this 
continent, is unbounded by specific provisions of the federal Constitu-
tion. 23 Yet these matters, too, can be modified by federal law.24 In 
contrast to these somewhat clear approaches to the tribe's authority 
over its members, tribal power to regulate the activities of nonmem-
bers in Indian country seems to turn ·on an elusive balancing of the 
intrusiveness of the regulation upon the autonomy of the nonmember, 
the extent to which the tribe has historically exercised such authority, 
the importance of the regulation to tribal self-government, and per-
haps even whether the nonmember is a Native American.25 Here, too, 
the principles are opaque and difficult to aggregate. For instance, it 
takes some extreme mental gymnastics to explain why a tribe should 
have expansive authority to tax a nonmember corporation doing busi-
17. See, e.g., Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission, 380 U.S. 685, 690 (1965) 
(comprehensive federal regulation of Indian traders preempts application of state gross proceeds 
tax to federally licens¢ trader doing business in Indian country). 
18. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973) 
(treaty and federal statutes, read against backdrop of tribal sovereignty, implicitly forbid state 
taxation of income earned by Native Americans in Indian country). 
19. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (state court may not assert jurisdiction 
over action brought by non-Indian against Indian for alleged breach of contract in Indian coun-
try). White Mountain Apache-Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), makes clear that the three 
potential bars each require an independent inquiry, and that any one of them can prevent state 
regulation. 
20. See, e.g., Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 725 (1983) (liquor sold for off-premises consump-
tion); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 155 
(1980) (cigarettes sold under conditions giving Native Americans competitive advantage over 
non-Indian tobacco dealers). 
21. See generally Canby, The Status of Indian Tribes in American Law Today, 62 WASH. L. 
REV. 1 (1987). 
22. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 356 (1977) ("It is undisputed that 
Indian tribes have power to enforce their criminal laws against tribe members."); United States v. 
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886) (Indians are regarded "as a separate people, with the 
power of regulating their internal and social regulations .... "). 
23. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896). 
24. See, e.g., Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1983) (requiring tri-
bal courts to accord defendants a variety of constitutional rights). 
25. See Canby, supra note 21, at 15-21. 
May 1989] Federal Indian Law 1203 
ness in Indian country,26 but no authority to impose, through the use 
of Anglo-American criminal procedure largely consistent with the Bill 
of Rights and including habeas corpus review in the federal courts, 27 
even a small sanction upon a nonmember (or non-Indian) who com-
mitted a crime there. 2s 
Second, federal Indian law is influenced heavily by particularly 
elusive historical and societal factors. Federal Indian policy has oscil-
lated from forced assimilation to limited respect for tribal self-govem-
ment. 29 Self-appointed supporters of better treatment for Native 
Americans have sometimes persuaded the federal government to adopt 
well-intentioned approaches that ultimately redounded to the extreme 
detriment of the supposed beneficiaries.30 Two centuries of depriva-
tions, coupled with the current poor socioeconomic status of Native 
Americans, may feed a white guilt that seemingly leads just as easily to 
forced assimilation ("make them like us, and their lot in life will im-
prove to our level") as to tribal self-determination. Most important 
for law professors and students may be the recognition that federal 
Indian law has historically gJ;eatly abetted the invasions of the Indians' 
sovereignty and land rights.31 In 1823, in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 32 the 
Supreme Court concluded that, in light of European "discovery" and 
supposed domination, tribes held their traditional lands essentially at 
the federal government's sufferance and could not convey their inter-
ests without federal approval. Ghief Justice Mars,hall stated: · 
We will not enter into the controversy, whether agriculturalists, 
merchants, and manufacturers, have a right, on a\'>stract principles, to 
expeJ hunters from the territory they possess, or to contx;act their limits. 
Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, 
26. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130. (1982). 
27. Criminal defendants in tribal courts are granted by statute most of the guarantees of the 
Bill of Rights and the right to habeas corpus review in the federal courts. Indian Civil Rights 
Act of 1968 §§ 201-203, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1982). 
28. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (holding that an 
Indian tribe did not have criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian who resided on the reservation). 
More recent cases suggest that the distinction relevant to a tribe's criminal jurisdiction is between 
tribe members and nonmembers, rather than between Indians and non-Indians. See p. 136 {dis-
cussing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 
(1980), and United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978)). The federal courts of appeals are 
split on the issue. Compare Greywater v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1988) {Indian/non-
Indian approach), with Dure v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1988) (member/nonmember 
approach). 
29. For a brief but thoughtful historical overview, see W. CANBY, supra note 11, at 9-31. 
30. The most vivid instance is the General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 
388 (1887), which was promoted by well meaning white reformers (as well as others with less 
noble goals) but resulted in massive destruction of the tribal land base and impractical ownership 
patterns of land that has remained in Indian hands. For a cpncise discussion of the Allotment 
Act, see pp. 19-22. 
31. See generally Strickland, Genocide-at-Law: An Historical and Contemporary View of the 
Native American Experience, 34 KAN. L. REv. 713 (1986). 
32. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
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whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals may be, re-
specting the original justice of the claim which has been successfully 
asserted. 33 
The "actual state of things"34 that Marshall stressed in a later opinion, 
and in which subsequent Justices have acquiesced, is unlike almost 
anything else a law student encounters and a law professor ponders. 
Simply put, the deprivations suffered by Native Americans have roots 
unique from those suffered by other disadvantaged minorities in 
American society. 35 Similarly, Indian tribes have unique rights as 
well, including the right to limited internal sovereignty,36 treaty 
rights, 37 and limited rights rising from their "trust" relationship with 
the federal government. 38 This, too, distinguishes them from other 
American mi:q.orities, which have been largely unsuccessful in pursu-
ing group rights. 39 
Third, federal Indian law, although heavily rooted in history, is 
33. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 588. On the prohibition of tribal transfer of land held by original 
Indian title, Marshall wrote: 
However this restriction may be opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized 
nations, yet, if it be indispensable to that system under which the country has been settled, 
and be adapted to the actual condition of the two people, it may, perhaps, be supported by 
reason, and certainly cannot be rejected by Courts of justice. 
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591-92. The text reflects the traditional understanding of M'Jntosh. See, 
e.g., HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 8, at 486-87; pp. 12-13. Recently, sev-
eral commentators have reread M'Intosh in a manner more respectful of tribal authority. See 
Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. REs. ]. 1, 23-46; Henderson, Un-
raveling the Riddle of Aboriginal Title, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 75 (1977). 
34. In Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543 (1832), Marshall said: 
[P]ower, war, conquest, give rights, which, after possession, are conceded by the world; and 
which can never be controverted by those on whom they descend. We proceed, then, to the 
actual state of things, having glanced at their origin; because holding it in our recollection 
might shed some light on existing pretensions. 
35. By this I do not mean to ignore the raw violence in which the American history of 
slavery is rooted. It is important to recognize, however, that the taking of the Native American's 
land - and the supposed justifications supporting it - do not have parallels in the experience of 
other disadvantaged American minorities. The comment in the text is not intended to assess the 
comparative immorality of the dominant American society's treatment of particular minorities. 
36. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24. 
37. Absent either consensual modification or unilateral Congressional abrogation of an In-
dian treaty, discussed infra in text accompanying notes 69-70, the provisions of the treaty remain 
intact despite any tensions between their terms and modem conditions. See, e.g., Washington v. 
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assoc., 443 U.S. 658 (1979). Charles 
Wilkinson has rightly contended that this "insulation against time" is an important right that is 
preservative of Indian sovereignty. See c. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE 
LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 32-52 (1987). 
38. See, e.g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942) (federal government 
breached trust duty by failing to pay money in accordance with requirements of treaty). 
39. See generally Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 
(1976) (proposing expansion of group rights for minorities). In general, it appears that Congress 
has been more receptive than the courts to group rights for American minorities. For example, 
following the Supreme Court's refusal to do so in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), Congress 
provided a measure of voting rights to racial groups constituting a minority of a state or local 
electorate. See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 
134 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973). 
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constantly evolving. The Supreme Court decides several federal In-
dian law cases a year, constituting a percentage of the Court's work-
load that exceeds its attention to seemingly less peripheral subjects 
such as securities regulation and bankruptcy.40 In part, at least, this is 
because of the disproportionate significance ofindian claims in today's 
world. For example, voidable conveyances from tribes two centuries 
ago continue to cloud land titles in the eastern United States.41 The 
scarce water resources of the western United States, so essential for 
agricultural development, are subject to supervening Indian claims.42 
And more aggressive assertions of sovereignty by tribal governments 
have led to serious confrontations about the scope and limits of fed-
eral, state, and tribal power.43 At a minimum, federal Indian law 
needs a reliable source that incorporates this evolution. Better yet 
would be a single source that analyzes that law in its context in mod-
ern society. 
Fourth, many of the most interesting aspects of federal Indian law, 
for better or worse, are the handiwork of judges - for example, origi-
nal Indian title,44 the status of tribes as "domestic dependent na-
tions,"4S the "plenary power" of Congress over tribes,46 the supposed 
trust relationship between the federal government and the tribes,47 the 
congeries of approaches taken to state and tribal authority to regulate 
in Indian country, 48 the canons for construing federal treaties and stat-
utes involving Indians, 49 even the standards for assessing the geo-
graphic limits of Indian country itself. so Just how well the Supreme 
Court has performed its expansive role in federal Indian law is the 
subject of sharp controversy.s1 To understand this area of law, one 
40. See C. WILKINSON, supra note 37, at 2. 
41. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985); Clinton 8i Hotopp, 
Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Restraints on Alienation of Indian Land: The Origins of the 
Eastern Land Claims, 31 ME. L. REv. 17 (1979). 
42. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); Getches, Management and Marketing 
of Indian Water: From Conflict to Pragmatism, 58 U. CoLO. L. REV. 515 (1988). 
43. See, e.g., supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. 
44. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33. 
45. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
46. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); Newton, Federal Power over 
Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195 (1984). 
47. See, e.g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942); Note, Rethinking the 
Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law, 98 HARV. L. REv. 422 (1984). 
48. See supra text accompanying notes 17-28. 
49. See infra text accompanying notes 69-70 & 74-79; Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Re-
view of Indian Treaty Abrogation: ''.As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows upon the Earth" -
How Lang a Time Is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 601 (1975). 
50. See, e.g., Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984). 
51. Compare, e.g., Ball, supra note 33, and Williams, The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: 
The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 
Wis. L. REv. 219 (critical of the Court's performance), with C. WILKINSON, supra note 37 (on 
balance, complimentary of the Court's performance). 
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must adopt a decisionmaking pose and search for the factors underly-
ing the Court's resolution of particular controversies.s2 This is no 
small task, both because the basic concepts - for example, tribal sov-
ereignty - are decidedly foreign to most persons, and because the 
Court's opinions often fail to stress facts that, as a practical matter, 
probably strongly influenced the outcome of the case. Illustratively, 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, s3 in which the Court held that 
tribal courts have no crimiitaljurisdiction over non-Indians,s4 takes on 
new light when it is noted that the reservation in question contained 
almost 3000 non-Indian residents and only fifty tribal members. One 
can discover this only by reading a footnote in the opinion, which 
makes the point in a matter-of-fact manner.ss Today, as in the days of 
Chief Justice Marshall, the judicial perception of "the actual state of 
things" remains crucial. 
Finally, major precedents in this field are relevant to a variety of 
diverse inquiries. For example, the three seminal opinions of Chief 
Justice Marshall - Johnson v. M'lntosh, s6 Cherokee Nation v. Geor-
gia, s1 and Worcester v. Georgia ss - together represent the foundation 
for understanding tribal sovereignty and federal power over tribes. 
Recent cases - for example, Oliphant, s9 Montana v. United States, 6o 
and Rice v. Rehner61 - are important precedents on those matters as 
well. When more specialized areas of federal Indian law are ex-
amined, however, these cases appear to fall into different categories. 
For example, M'Intosh involves original Indian title, 62 Cherokee Na-
tion provides the basis for the federal trust responsibility, 63 Worcester 
creates a strong presumption against state regulation in Indian coun-
try, 64 Oliphant involves tribal criminal jurisdiction, 6s and Montana 
52. For iln interesting attempt at this strategy, see Comment, The Most Dangerous Branch: 
An Institutional Approach to Understanding the Role of the Judiciary in American Indian Juris· 
dictional Determinations, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 989. 
53. 435 U.S. 19i (1978). 
54. 435 U.S. at 204. 
55. 435 U.S. at 193 n.1. Even when the Court candidly admits that demographics are impor· 
tant to the decision, it bas great difficulty articulating a principle under which such facts are 
legitimately.legally significant. See, e.g., Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 471·7~ & n.13 (1983) 
(relying in part upon subs,equent demographic developments in deciding whether an area re· 
mained Indian country, but admitting that this was "an unotthodox and potentially unreliable 
method"). 
56. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 {1823); see supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
57. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
58. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) SIS (1832). 
59. 435 U.S. 191 (1978); see supra text accompanying notes 53-55, and infra notes 71-73 and 
accompanying text. 
60. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
61. 463 U.S. 713 (1983). 
62. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572 (1823). 
63. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
64. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
May 1989] Federal Indian Law 1207 
and Rice deal with tribal authority to regulate hunting and fishing66 
and liquor transactions, 67 respectively. A reader who consults special-
ized discussions in federal Indian law sources can easily lose sight of 
the forest for the trees. Only a general source with a vision that 
sweeps across federal Indian law can attempt to avoid the tendency of 
the field to unravel into a congeries of technical specialties of seem-
ingly little relationship. 
Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 68 the one-volume treatise pub-
lished in 1982 by a consortium of scholars, cannot fully carry the 
freight of all these needs. The Handbook synthesized the state of the 
law in 1982, and along the way it made some concrete suggestions for 
legal evolution. On the whole, however, it did not subject federal In-
dian law to probing, fundamental analysis. In short, the Handbook 
largely performs the role of a good practitioner's treatise: it explains, 
indeed helps construct, the current state of the law and identifies some 
lines of argument that arise out of the law "as is." That is valuable to 
the law professor and student, but the Handbook falls short of satisfy-
ing their need for a comprehensive source. This is because the profes-
sor and student should be concerned not so much about the intricacies 
of the current state of the law, but rather about how that law devel-
oped, what normative and empirical assumptions underlie its princi-
ples, where that law is likely to go, and how one might craft arguments 
to take it on another course. The Handbook, though a valuable and 
worthwhile enterprise, is aimed largely in a different direction. 
In this scholarly vacuum, Judge Canby has succeeded in employ-
ing the nutshell format to good effect. Indeed, this second edition may 
reach the limits of scholarship possible in that format. Of course, be-
cause of the page limitations and simplifying exposition required for a 
study aid, he cannot engage in wide-ranging analysis of every problem. 
Nonetheless, he frequently deals with the major developments in fed-
eral Indian law, not as dry legal rules, but as intellectual problems. In 
particular, his second edition often uses a probing approach that seeks 
to open the student's mind to the essential controversies lurking be-
neath the black letter rules. Perhaps Canby's eight years as a federal 
appellate judge, coupled with the fourteen years 'he spent as a law pro-
fessor teaching . and writing about fed~ral Indian law, make him 
uniquely qualified to introduce students to the subject. In essence, he 
gives the students some perspective. In the snarl offederal Indian law, 
that contribution should not be underestimated. 
A good example is his discuss'ion of the judicial. treatment of In-
65. 435 U.S. 191, 193 (1978). 
66. 450 U.S. 544, 547 (1981). 
67. 463 U.S. 713, 715 (1983). 
68. HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 8. 
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dian treaties. In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 69 the Supreme Court held 
unequivocally that Congress has the authority unilaterally to abrogate 
an Indian treaty.7° Canby's analysis of Lone Wolf demonstrates that 
even a nutshell can provide a perspective, rather than just state a legal 
rule. He explains that Lone Wolf's conclusive presumption of con-
gressional good faith in treaty abrogation ran contrary to the facts of 
that case and implies, at least to the sensitive rea,der, that the Lone 
Wolf rule is normatively deficient (pp. 92-93). He then notes that a 
critical question is the method by which Congress may abrogate trea-
ties: May abrogation be accomplished only by express statutory provi-
sion, or should the courts construe unclear statutory language to effect 
a treaty abrogation if that seems consistent with congressional intent 
(p. 93)? Canby forthrightly acknowledges that the judicial role in 
these cases depends in part "upon a weighing and balancing of policy 
issues that may exist quite independently of the intent or purpose of 
Congress" (p. 94). He then explains that the trust relationship be-
tween the federal government and the tribes - a judicially created 
doctrine that he analyzes thoroughly (pp. 32-56) - should count 
heavily against implied treaty abrogation (p. 94). 
This discussion illuminates for the student - and professor - that 
normative judgments continue to rest at the heart of modem federal 
Indian law; that Indian law continues to be largely judicially con-
structed; and that its critics miss the mark if they aim only at Con-
gress, the state legislatures, or the tribes themselves. In particular, 
Canby rightly stresses that the canons of construction announced by 
the Supreme Court to guide interpretation of federal treaties and stat-
utes dealing with Indians (pp. 88-91) are based on normative factors. 
These canons, phrased sympathetically to protect Indian interests, 
arise not only from the judicially created trust responsibility, but also 
"[t]o compensate for the disadvantage at which the treaty-making pro-
cess placed the tribes" (p. 88). He also forthrightly recognizes that the 
Court invokes the sympathetic canons selectively, and he makes no 
attempt to gloss over the fact that the Court occasionally even ignores 
them (pp. 90-91). 
A second good example of the useful perspective Canby provides is 
his treatment of Oliphant11 and its aftermath (pp. 69-70). Oliphant 
held that tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians because 
that power would be inconsistent with their status as "domestic depen-
dent nations," even though no federal treaty or statute divested the 
tribe in question of this authority.72 Canby sets the stage well, noting 
first that Chief Justice Marshall, who developed the notion that the 
69. 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
70. 187 U.S. at 566. 
71. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
72. 435 U.S. ai 212; see supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
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tribes' sovereignty was truncated by their dependent relationship to 
the federal government, had articulated only two limitations inher-
ently arising from this status: Tribes could not convey land without 
federal government approval, and tribes could not enter into treaties 
with foreign powers. 73 Canby also explains that Marshall's analysis 
was based upon European notions of international law "which the In-
dian tribes might have thought quite irrelevant, but in Marshall's view 
that was the only kind of law that the Supreme Court could apply" (p. 
67). Canby stresses that some 150 years passed before the Court in 
Oliphant recognized a third inherent limitation on tribal sovereignty 
arising from dependent status (p. 69). "While the two limitations orig-
inally delineated by Chief Justice Marshall ... were almost inevitable 
concomitants of dependent status, that of Oliphant was considerably 
less so" (p. 69). "By opening the door to additional judicial limita-
tions upon tribal sovereignty," Canby continues, "Oliphant poses a 
significant potential threat to tribal autonomy" (p. 70). He concludes 
by noting several decisions following Oliphant that have made further 
judicial inroads upon tribal sovereignty based upon dependent status 
and stresses that the Court has yet to articulate a clear standard for 
these cases (p. 70). In later sections focusing on criminal jurisdiction 
in Indian country, Canby returns to Oliphant, more directly criticizes 
the opinion, and explains the practical difficulties arising from the de-
cision for the enforcement of criminal law in general, and hunting and 
fishing regulation in particular (pp. 137-39, 315). 
Canby's perspective and candor on these two topics, so useful to 
the law student and professor alike, can be profitably contrasted with 
the approach taken to them in the Handbook of Federal Indian Law. 
The Handbook makes the sympathetic canons of construction one of 
the cornerstones of federal Indian law. 74 This may well exaggerate 
them beyond their practical significance. In some cases the sympa-
thetic canons are trumped by other canons --for example, that waiv-
ers of sovereign immunity must be clearly stated, 75 or that there is a 
strong presumption against federal conveyance of a riverbed76 - and 
in other cases they are just ignored.77 More generally, canons of con-
struction are of limited utility in controlling judicial discretion in pub-
lic law, 78 and there is little reason to suppose that federal Indian law is 
any different. 79 
73. The relevant decisions are succinctly analyzed at pp. 66-69. 
74. See HANDBOOK ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 8, at 221-25. 
75. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980). 
76. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
77. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237 (1985). 
78. See generally W. EsKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: 
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 639-95 (1988) (analyzing the canons of stat-
utory interpretation and suggesting their contingent nature). 
79. See generally Kearl, On Teaching Federal Indian Law: A Commentary on Getches, 
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The Handbook's absence of critical analysis of the canons is not 
unique. One searches the Handbook in vain for any criticism - or 
praise, for that matter - of Lone Wolf, Oliphant, or the decisions fol-
lowing Oliphant that have further undercut tribal sovereignty. The 
Handbook does criticize dicta in Oliphant concerning a different mat-
ter, so which reveals one of its basic expository strategies: It evaluates 
open questions but simply acknowledges seemingly settled answers.s1 
II 
There is no single, general source that approaches federal Indian 
law with scholarly detachment and piercing analysis, with what my 
colleague Irving Younger called the "the play of intelligence." In the 
context of federal Indian law scholarship, his advice about legal writ-
ing is so squarely appropriate that it merits extended quotation: 
You must see through and around your subject, measuring it by more 
than one measuring stick, turning it over, testing it, arriving at a just and 
clear-headed assessment of its position in the hierarchy of things. 
The word that best expresses this requisite distance is "detachment," 
Utiderstood as a certain amusement with the enterprise upon which you 
are engaged, a sense of humor about yourself and your works. If a law-
yer has it, the lawyer's writing will unfailingly communicate the play of 
intelligence ("play" here being as important as "intelligence"). sz 
There are, of course, law review articles on federal Indian law with 
this scholarly perspective, as well as some thoughtful books and book-
length monographs worth particular attention.s3 None of these 
Rosenfe/t & Wilkinson's Cases and Materials on Federal Indian Law, 6 J. CONTEMP. L. I, 13-19 
(1979). 
80. See HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 8, at 340-41. The dicta involve 
whether a tribal court has concurrent jurisdiction over a tribal member who has committed a 
crime that could be prosecuted in federal court under the Major Crimes Act, included as § 9 of 
the Appropriations Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified as amended at 18 
u.s.c. §§ 1153, 3242 (1982)). 
81. I do not mean to suggest that Canby takes a critical approach to each topic surveyed in 
his nutshell. For example, he simply reports the holding in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United 
States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955), that there is no fifth amendment right to compensation when the 
federal government takes lands held by original Indian title. Seep. 259. Tee-Hit-Ton is subject 
to severe criticism both for the carte blanche given the federal government to take Indian lands 
and the implicit racism in the opinion. See, e.g., Hookey, The Gove Land Rights Case: A Judicial 
Dispensation for the Taking of Aboriginal Lands in Australia?, 5 FED. L. REV. 85, 99 (1972); 
Mickenberg, Aboriginal Rights in Canada and the United States, 9 OsGOODE HALL L. J. 119, 136 
(1971); Newton, At the Whim pf the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31 HASTINGS L. J. 
1215 (1980). In fairness to Canby, however, it would be highly difficult, if not impossible, to 
analyze critically all aspects of federal Indian law within the confines of the nutshell format. 
Moreover, even his uncritical citation of Tee-Hit-Ton is better than the treatment of that case in 
the Handbook, supra note 8. The Handbook includes a string citation to earlier cases that implies 
that' Tee-Hit-Ton flowed inexorably from prior precedent. See HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN 
LAW, supra note 8, at 491 n.162. On the contrary, Professor Newton has demonstrated that, 
based on existing law, the Tee-Hit-Ton Indians had a strong claim to fifth amendment compensa-
tion. See Newton, supra, at 1220-46. 
82. Younger, Let's Get Serious, 73 A.B.A. J. 110, 110 (May I, 1987). 
83. For books and book-length monographs, see, for example, R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, 
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sources, however, provides an analytical survey across the breadth of 
the field that is both accessible to the novice and still thought-provok-
ing to the expert. The best source the field has to offer on this score is 
Canby's pedagogical aid, which may indirectly encourage some schol-
arship through its useful application of perspective to the knotty 
problems in the area. · 
A nutshell cannot remake such a field, and Canby makes no claim 
to do so. He does not include any discussion of the exciting debates 
that are beginning to emerge in federal Indian law scholarshi.p.84 Nor 
does the nutshell consider the alternative visio:qs recently proposed by 
critics, which range from a fundamental recasting ·of Indian law85 (in 
part based on notions of sovereignty under international law86), to a 
less radical and more traditiona.1, "lawyerly" use of analogies to general · 
constitutional precedents to propose new constitutional rights for 
tribes and individual Native Americans. 87 Such developments are per-
haps too far afield for a nutshell. Yet, a concluding chapter briefly 
surveying "contempor~ theoretical controversies" would have been 
very useful for students and professors alike. So, too, a short survey of 
contemporary practical problems would have been helpful. Another 
timely addition, in this era of the bicentennial of the Constitution, 
would have been a discussion of the place of tribes in the constitu-
tional system. 
What federal Indian law needs today is what criminal procedure 
needed a decade ago: An outstanding, probing hornbook, written 
largely for law students and professors, but which would also provide 
substantial benefits to judges, practitioners, and legislators. Such a 
volume would have one primary goal: to assess the breadth of federal 
Indian law from a detached, scholarly perspective, critically assessing 
not only where we are, but how we got here, as well as the multiple 
paths that could lie ahead. What is needed is decidedly not a treatise 
rationalizing the law of insular colonial administration, 88 but rather a 
work that is critical and searching,· asking fundamental questions 
rather than imposing artificial coherence upon a chaotic field. In 
short, we need a general work of scholarly curiosity. 
Unfortunately, the prospects for such a hornbook are dismal. As a 
THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY (1980); c. WILKINSON, supra note 37. 
Ball, supra not~ 33. · 
84. See, e.g., supra note SL 
85. See Ball, s1:1pra note 33; Williams, supra note 51. 
86. See, e.g., Barsh, Indigenoils Peoples: A~ Emerging Object of International Law, 80 AM. J. 
INTL. L. 369 (1986); Comment, Toward Consent and Cooperation: Reconsidering the Political 
Status of Indian Nations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. ~v. 507 (1987). 
87. See Newton, supra note 46. 
88. I am indebted to Robert A. Williams, Jr., both for encouraging me to clarify the funda-
mental premise of the book that should be written and for the phrase in ~e text defining the 
counter-example of what I have in mind. 
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sitting appellate judge, Canby is presumably in no position to do what 
Israel and LaFave did in expanding a nutshell into a hornbook. Many 
of the prominent scholars in federal Indian law are members of the 
editorial board of the Handbook, and it seems likely that few, if any, of 
them have the time to undertake the different and difficult task of writ-
ing a hornbook while maintaining their affiliation with the Handbook 
There are not many others actively writing in this field, and few of 
them may be interested in undertaking such a daunting project in an 
area seemingly far removed from the mainstream of public law schol-
arship. In addition, the field has not yet generated many Native 
American legal scholars. Thus, it would be difficult for a team of 
hornbook authors to avoid the "imperial scholar" problem, identified 
by Richard Delgado, 89 in which non-minority voices perpetually 
drown out unique minority perspectives. Indeed, Delgado's fears seem 
particularly applicable to federal Indian law. As Rennard Strickland, 
one of the few Native American legal scholars, has said, those "who 
would make effective law and policy for Indian people must first un-
derstand Indian people."9° Finally, another overall disincentive is the 
relatively low regard for hornbooks held by some elite law faculties. 
In any event, the economics of publishing may well rule out a horn-
book even if a good scholarly team could be assembled. The market 
for such a hornbook is probably tiny: few students take the course in 
law school, and relatively few attorneys practice in the area. Indeed, it 
has been reported that it took a subsidy of $271,000 - a substantial 
portion of which was federal money - to produce the Handbook 91 
Perhaps the saddest consequence of this probable state of scholarly 
affairs is practical rather than academic. In the long run, public law 
scholarship and the practice of public law are inexorably linked. A 
first-rate hornbook, both by its own analytical force and by its deriva-
tive effect upon a generation of scholars, teachers, and students cum 
practitioners, might help federal Indian law evolve into a more analyt-
ically satisfying regime. At present, this law is in need of a transfusion 
of critical insight. This area of law has developed extraordinarily hap-
hazardly. Congress has periodically :fluctuated in its policy concerning 
Indian tribes92 and adopted important statutes without much delibera-
tion. 93 The Supreme Court has often drifted along with the congres-
89. Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review.of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. 
PA. L. REV. 561 (1984). 
90. Strickland, Friends and Enemies of the American Indian: An Essay Review of Native 
American Law and Public Policy, 3 AM. IND. L. REV. 313, 318 (1975). 
91. See Barsh, Book Review, 57 WASH. L. REV. 799, 810 n.55 (1982) (reviewing HANDBOOK 
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 8). The Handbook. which has not been updated since its 
1982 publication, carries a retail price of $80. 
92. See generally pp. 9-31 (discussing the history of federal Indian law and policy). 
93. For example, Congress in 1953 adopted a statute drastically extending the criminal and 
civil judicial jurisdiction of several states into Indian country, Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 
280, § 1162, 67 Stat. 588. The statute received little congressional deliberation. See generally 
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sional tide.94 Nonetheless, the Court's meanderings are reflected only 
tangentially in its opinions: it apparently has never directly overruled 
a precedent involving federal Indian law.95 The Court's decisions have 
simply piled up one on top of the other, leading commentators to be-
moan "the Court's lack of consistency and predictability."96 
Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA 
L. REV. 535 (1975). 
94. The Court has attributed to Congress a "plenary power" over Indian affairs and has 
never struck down as unconstitutional a federal statute regulating tribes. See generally Newton, 
supra note 46. For example, the Court decided United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913), 
during the period in which federal policy was to break up tribal landholding and encourage 
individual Indians to hold property and adopt white ways. The issue in that case was whether a 
federal law making it a crime to introduce liquor into Indian country applied to the New Mexico 
Pueblos. The answer turned on whether their lands were "Indian country" subject to the author-
ity of Congress. Unlike most Indian tribal lands, which American courts have conceptualized as 
held by the United States in trust for the tribes, the New Mexico Pueblos owned their lands 
communally in fee simple under grants from the Spanish government that were later confirmed 
by Congress. Despite this lack of any federal-tribal relationship based on land title, the Court 
held that the lands in question were subject to congressional authority because the Indians in 
question were a dependent Indian community. The Court stated in part: 
The people of the pueblos, although sedentary rather than nomadic in their inclinations, 
and disposed to peace and industry, are nevertheless Indians in race, customs, and domestic 
government. Always living in separate and isolated communities, adhering to primitive 
modes of life, largely influenced by superstition and feti[s]hism, and chiefly governed ac-
cording to the crude customs inherited from their ancestors, they are essentially a simple, 
uninformed and inferior people. . .• [T]hey have been regarded and treated by the United 
States as requiring special consideration and protection, like other Indian communities .... 
With one accord the reports of the superintendents charged with guarding their interests 
show that they are dependent upon the fostering care and protection of the Government, 
like reservation Indians in general; that, although industrially superior, they are intellectu-
ally and morally inferior to many of them; and that they are easy victims to the evils and 
debasing influence of intoxicants ...• 
[It] is not necessary to dwell specially upon the legal status of this people under either 
Spanish or Mexican rule, for whether Indian communities within the limits of the United 
States may be subjected to its guardianship and protection as dependent wards turns upon 
other considerations. Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regu-
late commerce with the Indian tribes, but long continued legislative and executive usage and 
an unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed to the United States as a superior 
and civilized nation the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection 
over all dependent Indian communities within its borders •••. "It is for [Congress], and not 
for the courts, to determine when the true interests of the Indian require his release from 
such condition of tutelage." 
231 U.S. at 39, 40-41, 45-46 (quoting Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U.S. 286, 315 (1911)) 
(citation omitted). 
95. This observation, consistent with that of others who teach federal Indian law courses, is 
difficult to document, both because of the nuances associated with judging what constitutes the 
"overruling" of precedent, and the enormity of examining all of the Court's federal Indian law 
cases (for one thing, what is "federal Indian law" is debatable at the margin). In any event, no 
federal Indian law decision leaps out upon a perusal of the lists of overruling decisions provided 
in Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Constitution of the United States 1789-
97 (1973) and S332-33 (1980 Supp). To be sure, there are instances in which later cases deviate 
from precedent and admit as much. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 
371, 411-15 (1980) (cutting back on the implications of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 
(1903), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 69-70). 
96. Pelcyger, Justices and Indians: Back to Basics, 62 ORE. L. R.Ev. 29, 30 (1983); see, e.g., 
Barsh, The Omen: Three Affiliated Tribes v. Moe and the Future of Tribal Self-Government, 5 
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The Court's rudderless course is understandable. As Russel Barsh 
has noted: 
[J]udges and lawyers share an education that excludes mature considera-
tion of tribal government. Few law textbooks in general use accord In-
dian law serious treatment. Ignorance is a powerful helpmate of 
confusion. In an appeal in which the advocates and judges have only 
briefly investigated an unfamiliar topic, we can expect what is in fact in 
evidence in the Supreme Court record: abused precedents, citations to 
inconsistent chains of precedent, essential cases and statutes overlooked, 
significant social and economic facts disregarded. 91 
My own experience8 lend force td Barsh's assertions. Neither I nor, so 
far as I know, any other of the Supreme Court clerks during the 1979 
Term had taken a course in federal Indian law.98 Nonetheless, we 
were called upon to help with several major decisions.99 Upon recon-
sideration, those decisions of the 1979 Term, like so many others in 
this field, embody only an illusion of coherence - and a frail one at 
that, since my students have little difficulty seeing through it. Yet, 
because I do not question the good faith of the Justices, the illusion 
may well amount to an unintentional - and therefore all the more 
pernicious - self-delusion. A first-rate hombook, and the scholar-
ship it could provoke, might expose this illusion and illuminate the 
essence of the controversies in this area. 
For the present, we have a growing wave of thoughtful law review 
writing, an excellent nutshell, and a useful treatise. Although these 
are more tools than have ever before been available, they alone surely 
cannot remake the field. But Native Americans, and their tribes, are 
not going away, and neither will the controversies of federal Indian 
law. It remains to be seen whether legal academia responds to the 
challenge. The highest ideals of the academy support making the ef-
fort, of course, but the practicalities of the scholarly and economic 
marketplaces are extraordinary impediments. Until federal Indian law 
is seen as an important area of public law rather than an esoteric back-
water, few new scholars will have the practical incentive to enter the 
field. And any enhanced scholarly status for federal Indian law is un-
likely to develop without a recognition that insights in this area may 
cast light on some fundamental general problems of American public 
AM. INDIAN L. R.Ev. 1, 1 (1977); Clinton, State Power over Indian Reservations: A Critical 
Comment on the Burger Court Doctrine, 26 S.D. L. R.Ev. 434, 43940 (1981). 
97. Barsh, supra note 96, at 56-57. 
98. I do not mean to overstate this limitation. Fonner Supreme Court clerks are notorious 
for overestimating their value to the Court. My point is simply that there probably is no area of 
law that routinely comes before the Supreme Court in which law clerks are of less potential 
assistance to the Justices. 
99. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980); Central Machinery 
Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 448 U.S. 160 (1980); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. 
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reserva-
tion, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980). 
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law: to name just two, the treatment of minorities and the exercise of 
judicial decisionmaking unconstrained by constitutional or statutory 
text. That recognition, in turn, will not occur without scholarship illu-
minating the linkage between federal Indian law and such enduring 
public law dilemmas.100 While the academy stagnates in this chicken-
and-egg stalemate, the marginality of this field of law - and of those 
Americans subjected to it - endures. 
100. Scholarship is about inquiry, not outcomes. There is no guarantee that more probing 
scholarship about federal Indian law will improve the lot of Native Americans; indeed, at least in 
the short run, it could prove counterproductive in particular disputes. Separating the roles of 
practitioner, law reformer, and scholar is not easy, particularly in a small field as overladen with 
the present effectS of past deprivations as federal Indian law. But if law professors have a unique 
role in the American legal system, they also necessarily have unique correlative responsibilities. 
